Android's 3 × 3 graphical pattern lock scheme is one of the widely used authentication method on smartphone devices. However, users choose 3 × 3 patterns from a small subspace of all possible 389,112 patterns. The two recently proposed interfaces, SysPal by Cho et al.
INTRODUCTION
The theoretical space of 3 × 3 patterns is large (389,112), however users choose simple patterns resembling English letters such as 'Z', 'S', 'M', 'N', 'L', 'R' and 'G' [1, 5, 7] . Moreover, characteristics such as knight moves, overlaps, direction changes, intersections (crosses) which enhance the visual complexity of patterns are used very rarely [3, 4, 8] . As a result, user-selected patterns are prone to a wide range of attacks including guessing and shoulder-surfing attacks. To improve the security of 3×3 patterns, Cho et al. proposed System-guided pattern lock (SysPal) that mandates users to include 1, 2 or 3 system-assigned random dot(s) during pattern creation [2] . The corresponding SysPal interfaces were referred to as 1-dot, Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363250 2-dot and 3-dot. The results of their online study involving 1417 participants show that 1-dot and 2-dot SysPal policies improved the guessing resistance of 3 × 3 patterns without affecting usability.
In our previous work [6] , we observed that the connectivity rules in a 3 × 3 grid are non-uniform and hence difficult to comprehend. As depicted in Figure 1 , a corner dot can be connected directly to 5 non-corner dots, a side dot can be connected directly to 7 dots while the center dot can be connected directly to any of the 8 dots. Further, a corner dot can be connected to other corner dot (e.g., 1 → 3) if the dot between them (e.g., 2) is already connected, whereas a side dot can be connected to the remaining eighth dot (e.g., 2 → 8) if the center dot 5 is already connected. Therefore, we proposed TinPal, an enhanced interface that employs real-time highlighting mechanism to inform users about the set of reachable dots from the currently connected dot [6] . The working of TinPal is illustrated in Figure 2 . The results of our lab study with 99 participants show that TinPal resulted in significantly longer and complex patterns. The guessing resistance also improved without degrading usability. • We conduct a new user study with 147 participants and collect 3 × 3 patterns on three SysPal interfaces, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot. • We analyze patterns created across all five groups i.e., Original, TinPal, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot, using various features such as pattern length, stroke length, knight moves and overlaps. • We also compare the guessing resistance of patterns in all five groups using Markov model based guessing algorithm. • Finally, we report important usability indicators such as pattern creation time, recall time and recall attempts in all five groups.
USER STUDY AND RESULTS
Previously, we evaluated the impact of TinPal on users' pattern choices with a lab study involving 99 participants (August 2017) [6] . Out of 99 participants, 49 were randomly assigned to the Original group and 50 to the TinPal group. To collect patterns on SysPal interfaces [2] , we conduct another lab study with a different set of 147 participants (January 2018). Out of 147 participants, 50 were randomly assigned to the 1-dot group, 49 to the 2-dot group and 48 to the 3-dot group. Thus, we have patterns from total 246 participants (99+147) on five different interfaces.
To make our study accessible across all mobile devices, we created a HTML/JS web application that could be accessed using any standard browser. We simulated the look and feel of Android pattern lock as closely as possible. Participants were given gifts worth $2 for completing the study. There is no IRB in our organization for approving studies involving human subjects. However, we took all necessary steps in order to be compliant with privacy regulations. The data was collected anonymously after obtaining the consent of participants and was used for research purpose only. Demographics. The demographics of the participants are summarized in Table 1 . Majority of participants were young, right handed, with CS/IT background and belonged to the same nationality. We found no statistically significant difference in gender, handedness, age or background of participants across five groups (p > 0.01, corrected two-tailed Fischer's Exact Test). Further, a large fraction of participants in all five groups used Android phones and a majority of them were familiar with the Android pattern lock scheme. Procedure. As described in [6] , the study involved 6 stages: 1) Consent form, 2) Introduction to assigned pattern lock interface, 3) Pattern creation where users were asked to create a pattern that they would use to protect their device, 4) Distraction task (graphical puzzles), 5) Demographics questionnaire and 6) Pattern recall. Statistical Tests. We compared categorical data using two-tailed Fischer's Exact test (FET). Since pattern characteristics (e.g., pattern length) and usability metrics (e.g., pattern creation time) were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null hypothesis that data is normal with a p < 0.01), we used two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test with a significance level of α = 0.01. As there are five groups, 10 pairwise comparisons were performed. To account for multiple comparisons, we applied Bonferroni correction and claimed statistical significance if p < α = 0.01/10 = 0.001. We claimed the result to be of possible significant interest if p < 0.01. Limitations. We performed two separate studies to collect patterns on TinPal and SysPal interfaces, however we ensured that the setup used in both studies is identical and the same participant is not enrolled in more than one group. Similar data collection strategies have been reported in the previous studies [1, 7] . The sample used in our comparative study is younger, more tech-savvy and smaller in size (246 participants). We plan to conduct a large-scale user study with a more diverse sample in the future. Pattern length. The number of dots connected in the pattern is referred to as pattern length. For instance, the length of the pattern 38519 ( Figure 2 ) is 5. In the TinPal group, the number of patterns with at least 7 dots was 64%, whereas in the Original, 1-dot, 2dot and 3-dot groups the numbers were 40.82%, 32%, 38.78% and 29.17% respectively (Figure 3a ). We found significant difference in the pattern length between the TinPal group and all SysPal groups except 2-dot group (p < 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test). Thus, TinPal not only made users aware of all connection choices, but also influenced users to connect more dots in their pattern. Stroke Length. The concept of stroke length captures the physical length of the pattern and is defined as the sum of Euclidean distances of all line segments within the pattern [1, 5] . The length of the segment 1 → 2 is defined as 1, 1 → 3 as 2, 1 → 4 as 1, 1 → 5 as √ 2, 1 → 6 as √ 5, 1 → 7 as 2, 1 → 8 as √ 5 and 1 → 9 as 2 √ 2. The number of dots in the patterns 12369 and 38519 is same (5), however their stroke lengths are 4 (all unit length) and 7.48 ( √ 5+1+ √ 2+2 √ 2) respectively. We found that the stroke length of patterns in the TinPal group (8.39) was significantly higher than any other group (p < 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test). Normalizing the stroke length with respect to the pattern length reveals the mean length of the line segment used for creating patterns. The normalized stroke length of patterns in the TinPal group was highest 8.39 7.04 ∼ 1.19, whereas in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot group it was 6.05 6.08 ∼ 0.99, 5.80 5.90 ∼ 0.98, 5.81 6.04 ∼ 0.96 and 5.50 5.92 ∼ 0.93 respectively. Thus, TinPal patterns were created using relatively longer segments. The number of unique line segments employed in the TinPal group was also higher 59 than all other groups ( Table 2) . Knight Moves. A knight move occurs when a dot is connected to another dot that is two units away in the horizontal (vertical) direction and one unit away in the vertical (horizontal) direction. In other words, line segments with the Euclidean distance √ 5 are referred to as knight moves. For instance, the segment 3 → 8 in the pattern 38519 is a knight move (Figure 2b ). In the TinPal group, the number of patterns containing at least one knight move was 58%, whereas the numbers in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups were 22.45%, 18%, 14.29% and 18.75% respectively (Figure 3b ). Overlaps. A line segment between two dots in a pattern is referred to as an overlap, if the dot between them is already connected. In other words, line segments with the Euclidean distance of either 2 or 2 √ 2 are referred to as overlaps. For instance, the segment 1 → 9 in the pattern 38519 is an overlap (Figure 2e ). In the TinPal group, the number of patterns containing at least one overlap was 40%, whereas in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups the numbers were 12.24%, 16%, 9.16% and 4.17% respectively (Figure 3c ). 
Security Results

Pattern Guessability
We use Markov model based attack technique to estimate the guessing resistance of patterns in all five groups [1, 5, 7 ]. An n−gram Markov model predicts the next event based on the past n −1 events. Therefore, the probability of a l length pattern s 1 . . . s l is given by:
Current dataset. We construct a separate Markov model for each group. Since our control group dataset has 49 patterns and corresponding 298 data points that are insufficient to learn trigram probabilities, we resort to bigrams (n = 2). To account for unseen bigrams, we use Laplace smoothing. Since the Android security policy limits the number of failed pattern attempts to 20 [2] , we report pattern cracking results for the first 20 guesses only. We perform 10-fold cross validation on patterns collected in each group. We split patterns into 10 approximately equal-sized subsets. We combine 9 subsets into the training set and use the remaining subset as a testing set. We learn bigrams probabilities using the training set and estimate the probabilities of all possible 389,112 patterns using equation (1) . Subsequently, we sort all patterns in the decreasing order of probability and simulate guessing attack on the test set. We perform this validation 10 times and use each subset in turn as a test set. We repeat this entire process 10 times and take the average. The guessability results are summarized in Table 2 . The guessing algorithm could not crack any pattern (0%) in the TinPal group, whereas it cracked 12%, 10%, 8% and 20% patterns in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups respectively. ASIACCS'17 dataset. We also use 69,797 3 × 3 patterns collected in one of our earlier studies [5] and build a trigram model. We estimate the probabilities of all possible 389,112 patterns and simulate guessing attack on each of our five datasets. The cracking results are given in Table 2 . Within first 20 attempts, the guessing algorithm cracked 4% of the patterns in TinPal group, whereas it cracked 12.24%, 8%, 6.12% and 18.75% of the patterns in the Original, 1-dot, 2-dot and 3-dot groups respectively. Overall, patterns created using TinPal were longer and more guessing-resistant. Further, as reported in [2] , patterns created on 1-dot and 2-dot interfaces were more secure than the original interface whereas patterns created on the 3-dot interface were most vulnerable. Thus, mandating too many dots could reduce the search space for the attacker.
Usability Results
Creation Time. The time required to create a pattern in the TinPal group (median 3.91s) was maximum among all five groups (Table  3 ). However, we note that the stroke length of patterns created in the TinPal group (mean 8.39) was also higher than the other groups (Table 2) . Therefore, we normalize the pattern creation time i.e., for each participant, we divide the time required to create the pattern with the stroke length of that pattern. The distribution of the normalized pattern creation time across all five groups is shown in Figure 3d . After normalization, we found no find significant difference in the pattern creation time between any pair of groups (all p > 0.001, corrected two-tailed WMW test). However, we found significant interest in the normalized creation time between the TinPal group and other groups (p < 0.01) which suggests that participants who used TinPal paid attention to the highlighted dots. Recall Time. After creating patterns, participants spent around 4 minutes solving graphical puzzles, and answering demographic questionnaire. The time required to recall pattern in the TinPal group (median 2.11s) was relatively higher than the other groups (Table 3 ). However, after normalizing the recall time with respect to the stroke length (Figure 3e ), we did not find significant difference between any groups (all p > 0.01, corrected two-tailed WMW test). Recall Attempts. Around 96.00% of the participants in all five groups successfully recalled their pattern within just three attempts ( Table 3 ). We found no significant difference in the login attempts between any pair of groups (all p ∼ 1, corrected two-tailed FET). 
CONCLUSION
In this work, we evaluated the efficacy of SysPal and TinPal interfaces with a user study involving 246 participants. The results of our comparative study indicate that participants who used TinPal created significantly longer patterns containing knight moves and overlaps. Guessability results also show that patterns created using TinPal are more resilient to guessing attacks than patterns created in any other group. Further, we did not find any significant difference in the usability of SysPal and TinPal patterns. These results are encouraging as TinPal just informed users about all available options and did not force them to choose a particular option.
